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1  Introduction 
Assessing the net cost and unfair burden of universal service obligations (USO), and 
determining how this should be financed, is a key issue for operators, regulators 
and other stakeholders in the European postal industry. The Third Postal Directive 
2008/6/EC (Third Directive) provides some guidance as to how the net cost should 
be calculated, however, there is no defined prescriptive approach. The calculation of 
the net cost of the USO is extremely complex and given that it is likely to be funded 
by the public or other operators any assessment needs to be extremely robust. In 
this  paper  we  propose  to  present  a  robust  and  practical  approach  to  assessing 
properly the net cost of the USO in line with the guidance provided by the Third 
Directive. 
Traditionally, financing of the universal service in the postal sector has relied on 
granting the provider a reserved area. The need for alternative funding sources after 
full liberalisation has increased the interest of regulators and the public in knowing 
the  cost  of  universal  service  provision  and  compensating  the  universal  service 
provider (USP) appropriately. Recent attempts at assessing the net cost of the USO 
have been based on the profitability cost approach pioneered by Panzar (2000) and 
Cremer et al. (2000). 
Recently  academics  have  argued  that  the  market  structure  within  which  the 
incumbent operates and the actual cost/burden of USO are directly related to the 
regulatory regime and the funding mechanism in place (Jaag and Trinkner (2010) 
and  Boldron  et  al.  (2009)).  Additionally,  they  state  that  individual  elements  or 
dimensions of the USO cannot be priced separately because this would either result 
in inconsistent or biased cost estimates (Jaag, Koller and Trinkner (2009)).  
Calculating  the  net  cost  of  the  USO  involves  comparing  the  difference  in  profit 
levels with and without the USO. This implies knowing the differences in costs and 
revenues in scenarios with and without the USO. The Third Directive states that 
when calculating the net cost, the impact on profits and all other relevant elements, 
which accrue to a USP, must be considered. While the cost side is relatively easily 
understood because it is directly linked to products and processes, the revenue side 
is more difficult to assess (and not yet fully understood) because indirect effects 
need to be taken into account (‚intangible benefits‛). Morover, the changes from 
current practice implied by relaxing USO constraints may be sufficiently large to 
undermine the reliability of historical estimates of elasticities, e.g. with respect to 
quality, in predicting demand changes.  
In this paper we set out a holistic approach that incorporates recent developments in 
assessing the net cost of the USO and presents a robust methodology for practical 2 
implementation. We analyse the issues relating to assessing the net costs of the USO 
with particular focus on the benefits associated with USO and current empirical 
approaches to calculating the net costs. We then present an overview of approaches 
that  have  been  applied  in  various  countries  and  highlight  their  strengths  and 
shortcomings in light of the necessarily theoretical aspects discussed in the first part 
of  the  paper.  Finally,  we  present  a  practical  approach  that  we  believe  assesses 
robustly the net cost of the USO. 
2  Issues in USO-Costing 
Article 7 of the Third Directive states:  
‚Where a Member State determines that the universal service obligations *…+ entail a net 
cost *…+ and represent an unfair financial burden on the universal service provider(s), it 
may introduce: 
  a mechanism to compensate the undertaking(s) concerned from public funds; or 
  a mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of  the universal service obligations 
between providers of services and/or users.‛ 
Annex I contains guidance on how to calculate the net cost of the USO: 
‛The net cost of universal service obligations is any cost related to and necessary for the 
operation of the universal service provision. The net cost of universal service obligations 
is  to  be  calculated,  as  the  difference  between  the  net  cost  for  a  designated  universal 
service provider of operating with the universal service obligations and the same postal 
service provider operating without the universal service obligations. 
The  calculation  shall  take  into  account  all  other  relevant  elements,  including  any 
intangible and market benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to 
provide universal service, the entitlement to a reasonable profit and incentives for cost 
efficiency.‛ 
Annex I implies using the profitability cost approach, i.e. a calculation of the cost of 
the USO assuming the competitive effects of introducing asymmetric obligations to 
selected market participants in a comprehensive and consistent way.1  
Annex I further states that the  net cost should be computed individually for the 
various USO elements and ‚summed up‛ to avoiding double counting:  
‚The calculation of the net cost of specific aspects of universal service obligations is to be 
made separately and so as to avoid the double counting of any direct or indirect benefits 
and  costs.  The  overall  net  cost  of  universal  service  obligations  to  any  designated 
universal service provider is to be calculated as the sum of the net costs arising from the 
specific components of universal service obligations, taking account of any intangible 
benefits.‛ 
                                                           
1   The Directive states that compensation for the USP may only be introduced if the USO entails a net 
cost and represents an unfair burden. Similarly to quantifying the benefits of the USO, there has 
been little economic discussion as to how exactly define an unfair burden. In this paper we focus on 
the  costing  of  the  USO  rather  than  the  definition  of  an  unfair  burden.  See  Jaag  (2010)  for  a 
discussion of various different criteria by which the (un-)fairness of a burden could be assessed and 
by which the appropriateness and the level of compensation could be determined. See also CERP 
(2008), Boldron et al. (2009) and de Donder et al. (2010).  3 
The Third Directive raises three critical issues regarding calculation of the net cost of 
the USO: The individual assessment of specific aspects of the USO; consideration of 
intangible and market benefits; and interaction between costing and financing. We 
discuss each of these issues below. 
2.1  Costing of individual elements of the USO 
The Third Directive states that net costs should be computed separately across the 
various  USO  elements  so  as  to  avoid  double  counting  of  costs  and  benefits. 
However, as has previously been identified, e.g. in Jaag, Koller and Trinkner (2009), 
the  inherent  problem  with  such  a  disaggregated  approach  is  the  presence  of 
interdependencies between the individual USO elements. In Figure 1 we illustrate 
the case of two USO dimensions: restrictions on pricing and on the range of services 
offered. 
Figure 1: Importance of the interdependence of USO dimensions. 
Source: Jaag, Koller and Trinkner (2009) 
 
In Figure 1, the vertical axis represents restrictions on the product/ service (S) with 
restrictions in pricing on the horizontal axis (P). The square with the black border 
depicts the total ‘cost’ of the universal service provision in its current scope defined 
as  SUSO  and  PUSO.  The  white  area  is  the  total  ‘cost’  of  a  reduced,  non-binding 
universal  service  provision  defined  such  that  the  USO  operator  can  realise  its 
optimal business strategy in both dimensions as if there had been no obligation (S* 
and P*). The sum of all the grey areas (the difference between the bordered and the 
white area, SUSO x PUSO minus S* x P*) is the incremental cost of the USO in both 
dimensions. Because S* and P* are profit maximising positions, imposing SUSO and 
PUSO results in an incremental net cost. 
As illustrated (on the left-hand side of Figure 1), double counting is a problem if the 
net  costs  of  the  obligations  are  computed  separately  based  on  actual  universal 
service  restrictions  in  the  other  dimension(s).  However,  if  the  net  cost  of  each 
dimension is calculated based on a scenario with no other obligations (right-hand 
side of Figure 1), an important part of the net cost is neglected. Consequently, the 
cost of this combined restriction is significantly higher than the costs derived from a 
separate approach. It is therefore necessary to integrate those USO dimensions.  
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Therefore, to assess properly the net cost of the USO, a holistic approach is required 
that accounts for these price and product interdependencies. This approach should 
also  incorporate  the  interaction  with  potential  intangible  benefits  as  discussed 
below. 
2.2  Intangible benefits 
The Directive states that intangible benefits should be calculated separately to avoid 
the  double  counting  of  any  direct  or  indirect  benefits  and  costs.  However,  all 
benefits  of  the  USO  and  the  incremental  costs  of  the  USO  are  both  intrinsically 
linked  to  an  operator’s  profits.  Assessing  net  cost  of  the  USO  should  therefore 
involve  a  holistic  approach  including  an  assessment  of  the  intangible  benefits 
related to the USO. Therefore, any assessment should include reviewing the types of 
benefits  associated  with  being  the  USP  before  developing  a  sufficiently  robust 
profitability approach that includes these benefits in the calculation. 
Our discussion in Section 3 will show that recent attempts at quantifying the net 
cost  of  the  USO  have  involved  making  separate  quantitative  assessments  of 
intangible benefits or no assessment at all. 
 
Types of benefits  
Typically an assessment of the benefits associated with a USP will refer to economic 
literature  and  research  undertaken  in  the  postal  sector.  However,  our  review  of 
existing  literature  on  the  costs  and  benefits  of  a  USO  in  the  postal  sector  has 
identified little in the way of previous work on the benefits, particularly in terms of 
quantification. Therefore, emphasis will need to be placed on comparable analysis 
that has been performed in other regulated sectors. However, in doing so care needs 
to be taken to ensure that the benefits identified in other sectors are relevant to post. 
For  instance,  telecommunications  is  often  used  as  a  comparable  sector  when 
considering  the  benefits  associated  with  the  USO.  In  telecommunications,  a  key 
benefit is the ‚Life Cycle Effect‛.2 This relates to  the benefit of  serving a group of 
unprofitable customers today with the view that they will become more profitable 
in the future. However, with large volume declines, falling revenues, and increased 
competition in the postal sector such benefits are unlikely to exist.   Therefore,  a 
careful assessment of the types of benefits to include is required. 
Benefits implicitly included in the net cost of the USO calculation 
The Directive calls for separate consideration of intangible benefits, however from 
an  economic  point  of  view,  the  benefits  of  the  USO  should  not  be  assessed 
independently from the incremental costs of the USO as they are both intrinsically 
linked to an operator’s profits. 
                                                           
2   See e.g. Oftel (2000). 5 
The net cost of the USO should be calculated as the profits of the USP acting as a 
profit maximising entity (‘but-for’ scenario) minus the profits of the USP performing 
the  current  USO  (cf.  Panzar,  2000,  and  Cremer  et  al.,  2000).  By  definition,  any 
benefits  relating  to  USO  products  would  be  included  in  this  calculation. 
Additionally, the majority of the broader benefits related to being the USO provider, 
such as possible USO associated customer loyalty or incremental profits associated 
with non-USO products, would also be included in this assessment. For instance, a 
benefit to the USP is the sale of non-USO products that are delivered to customers 6 
days a week. If in the ‘but-for’ scenario the USP decided that it would not deliver 6 
days a week, then it is likely that some of this non-USO volume that was delivered 
on the back of the 6-day a week service would be lost to competitors or would 
migrate  to  alternative  products  with  different  levels  of  profitability.  This  loss  in 
incremental profit can be quantified as a benefit of the USO. Additionally, benefits 
such as VAT exemptions can be included in the ‘but-for’ scenario by including all 
VAT effects explicitly (cf. Dietl et al., 2010, which elaborates the competitive effects 
of VAT exemptions in the postal sector). 
 These  examples  illustrate  that  the  USO  reduces  the  profits  of  the  operator  by 
placing extra costs on operations; however, some of this reduced profit is mitigated 
by benefits that increase profits. 
In  comparing  the  operator’s  actual  financial  performance  against  the  ‘but-for’ 
scenario we remove the impact of the costs of the USO and the benefits - the profit 
we are left with is that of a profit-maximising operator. This approach provides the 
net cost of the USO including costs and benefits and is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4. 
2.3  Interaction of costing and financing 
The net cost of USO using the profitability approach also depends on the design of 
the compensation mechanism, because the financing mechanism distorts the market 
outcome.  This  issue  has  been  discussed  by  e.g.  Jaag  and  Trinkner  (2010), 
Borsenberger  et  al.  (2010),  and  Jaag  (2010).  If  the  amount  of  compensation  is 
determined before the financing mechanism is devised, the net compensation from 
an ex post perspective may be incorrect. If the USP is compensated from the general 
government  budget,  this  does  not  (or  only  insignificantly)  affect  the  market 
equilibrium. In this case, USO costing and financing are independent of each other. 
However, if there is a turnover or unit tax levied from the operators in the market in 
order to finance the USP’s contribution, this affects the operators’ effective marginal 
cost and therefore distorts their pricing and possibly market entry decisions. This 
distortion needs to be considered when calculating the USO net cost. Sequentially 
calculating the net cost and then determining the operators’ contribution to a USO 
fund  –  as  envisioned  in  the  Directive  –  may  result  in  a  huge  over-  (or  under-) 6 
compensation  of  the  USP  (See  Jaag  (2010)).  A  compensation  fund  to  which  all 
operators (including the USP) contribute according to their market shares will lead 
to an under-compensation as the USP contributes to the majority of compensation 
itself. In contrast, if the USP is excluded from contributions, this will result in over-
compensation: The competitors’ marginal cost increases due to their contribution to 
the fund such that they are less competitive. This reduces their optimal scope of 
operations  (e.g.  with  respect  to  their  profitable  product  range  and/or  regional 
coverage) which positively affects the USP’s market position.  
We therefore propose an integrated approach to USO costing and financing where 
the  regulatory  authority  sets  the  contribution  rate  such  that  the  USP’s  profits 
remains unchanged comparing a situation without USO and one with USO after 
compensation. 
2.4  Summary 
The calculation of the net cost of the USO is extremely complex. Given that it is 
likely to be funded by the public or operators, any assessment needs to be robust. 
We argue that an integrated approach is required to calculate the net cost of the 
USO which includes a robust counterfactual that considers the interaction of the 
different  USO  elements/requirements,  the  intangible  benefits  and  the  financing 
mechanism.  This approach would need to be consistent and transparent to generate 
accurate results. In the next section we will briefly discuss some of the approaches 
that have been applied to assessing the net cost of the USO. 
3  Approaches to USO-Costing 
To understand the approaches that have been adopted in the postal sector, we have 
reviewed some prominent recent studies assessing the net cost of the USO in three 
European  countries.  Owing  to  space  considerations,  we  have  omitted  a  detailed 
discussion of a study of the United States completed by Cohen and McBride (2008). 
We do, however, include a summary in the table below.  7 
Table 1: USO costing approaches and their consideration of different USO 
dimensions 
  Denmark   Norway  United Kingdom  United States 
Study/Source  Copenhagen 
Economics (2008) 
Norway Post (2010)  Frontier Economics 
(2008) 
Cohen and McBride 
(2008) 
Purpose  Inform policy  Determine subsidy  Inform policy  Inform policy 





Some other elements 
Delivery freq.; Post 
office services; Free 




targets; Single class 





Unzoned media rates; 
Losses on market 
dominant products; 
Some other elements  
Without-USO 
counterfactual 
Yes  Yes  Use regulator -






Partial. E.g. price 
differentiation 
mitigates delivery to 
expensive postcodes 













offsets a USO cost 
element. 
Not clear  No  No 
USO cost  FY 2005: DKK 148m 
(€20m) 1.5% of op. 
ex. 
FY 2006: NOK 253m 
(€31m) 2.3% of op. 
ex. 




GBP 271m (€400m) 
4% of op. ex. 
FY 2007: $7.63bn 
(€5.57m), 10% of 
revenue 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2008). Cohen and McBride (2008). Dieke and Niederpruem (2008), page 37.  
Frontier Economics (2008). Weseth (2010). Note: Historical average annual exchange rates compiled by the ECB 
are used to convert all amounts to Euros. Norway 2010 amount is estimated by Weseth (2010) using 2009 
average exchange rate. 
These  studies  rely  on  the  profitability  cost  approach  described  above  using  a 
counterfactual  non-USO  scenario  to  calculate  the  net  cost  for  different  USO 
requirements.  Most  approaches  consider  both  the  direct  and  indirect  volume 
impacts within the cost calculation for each element. An indirect volume impact 
involves,  for  example,  the  effect  on  weekday  volumes  of  eliminating  Saturday 
deliveries.  Our  review  identifies  that  none  of  the  studies  fully  considers  the 
simultaneous  interaction  of  changes  in  different  USO  elements,  financing  and 
intangible  benefit  assessment,  as  we  advocate  in  this  paper.  This  should  not 
necessarily  be  construed  as  a  criticism  of  the  authors  of  these  studies  as  often 
authors are restricted by the scope of work they have been engaged to perform. The 8 
table summarises the overall conclusions of our review. We discuss the approach in 
each country in more detail. 
3.1  Denmark 
The  Danish  Chamber  of  Commerce  commissioned  Copenhagen  Economics  to 
calculate the cost of the USO to Post Danmark. The study considers the cost of 15 
USO elements in a four step profitability cost approach which: 
1)  determines whether a USO element constrains Post Danmark; 
2)  describes Post Danmark’s commercial options in the absence of the USO, 
and, for each element that is determined to be a constraint, calculates the 
associated reduction in cost; 
3)  calculates the corresponding loss in revenue for each element; and 
4)  subtracts the revenues from the costs to determine the net cost of each USO 
element. 
Of the 15 elements considered only two are found to result in a net cost: 3  
  the inability to reduce the frequency of mail delivery from six days to five 
days (DKK130m, €17m, 2005); and 
  the inability to eliminate free delivery to the blind result (DKK18m, €2m, 
2005).  
Only  the  interaction  between  selected  elements  of  the  USO  is  considered.  For 
example,  in  the  counterfactual  scenario  it  is  suggested  the  flexibility  offered  by 
price-differentiation would, in part, prevent the reduction of deliveries to the most 
expensive postcode areas. The effect is not quantified, however, and cannot be said 
to form part of a systematic holistic approach aimed at considering all interactions. 
The report also does not include a discussion of the impact of the choice of financing 
mechanism. 
Copenhagen  Economics  suggests  that  intangible  benefits  offset  the  net  cost  of 
certain elements of the USO but without quantifying their benefits. For example, the 
DKK40m (€5m, 2005) cost of delivering mail to the 1% of the population in the most 
expensive postcode areas was offset because, it is argued, that Post Danmark would 
not  reduce  the  service  due  to  the  benefits  of  the  sales  generated  by  offering  a 
nationwide  service.  Other  intangible  benefits  mentioned  but  not  quantified  are 
customer loyalty from Post Danmark’s time as a monopoly (goodwill) and other 
competitive  advantages  such  as  VAT  exemption  and  ownership  of  the  postal 
network. The report does not establish a consistent analytical approach to evaluate 
the intangible benefits and their overall impact on all USO elements. 
                                                           
3   Copenhagen Economics (2008), page 12. 9 
The study concludes there is no unfair burden because the net costs are offset by the 
Post  Danmark’s  benefits  as  incumbent,  specifically  the  goodwill  and  customer 
loyalty  generated  by  its  previous  monopoly  status,  its  VAT  exemption  and 
ownership of the postal network.  
3.2  Norway 
Norway Post uses a profitability cost model, the ‚Alternative commercial strategy‛ 
(ACS) model to estimate the net cost of the USO annually. The Norwegian State 
uses  this  estimate  in  deciding  whether  the  USO  is  sufficiently  funded  through 
monopoly profits or merits state funding.  
The ACS counterfactual is modelled to be close to the current commercial strategy 
because, it is contended, Norway Post’s message to its customers, employees and 
various  government  authorities  regarding  its  service  quality,  low  prices,  high 
productivity, etc. is that it is only in small part determined by the cost of the USO. 
We  argue  that  this  may  be  an  overly  restrictive  assumption  making  the 
counterfactual  less  realistic.  ACS  is  also  limited  by  its  compartmentalised 
calculations and lack of a holistic approach taking simultaneous account of benefits 
and funding mechanisms. 
The counterfactual considered by Norway Post consists of a service with different 
delivery times for some households and changes to the post-office structure. The 
ACS will cut delivery service from 6 days to 5 days for 15% of households and to 2 
days  for  5%  of  households,  generating  annual  savings  of  €12m  and  €29m, 
respectively. Under the ACS more post offices will be run by third parties and they 
will not offer bank services, resulting in an annual net cost saving of €15m. This 
latter change to the post office structure is modelled to have no significant effect on 
postal  volume,  although  all  revenues  from  bank  services  are  lost.  4  All  other 
elements considered, together result in an annual €1m cost saving. This approach 
does not appear to consider interdependencies between USO elements or financing 
mechanisms as advocated in this paper. 
Norway  Post  considers  its  ACS  to  be  compatible  with  the  Third  Directive’s 
requirement that it takes account of intangible benefits. In particular, it argues that 
‚Norway Post’s benefits from the USO are implicitly taken into account in the definition of 
the  ACS‛,5  though it is not clear how this is implemented in practice.   Although 
Norway Post recognises that  its  earlier  model  ‚failed  to  take  account  of  network 
economies, such as the effect of service termination in one region on the demand in other 
                                                           
4   Weseth (2010), slide 7. 
5   Weseth (2010), slide 7. 10 
regions‛, 6 it is not clear to us that these effects have been appropriately modelled in 
the ACS. 
The model estimates the total net cost of the USO as €57m for 2010. Since 2006, the 
government has not subsidised the USO because it expects profits from Norway 
Post’s other businesses to be sufficient to cover this cost, i.e. it does not consider that 
an  unfair  burden  exists.  Arguably,  this  indicates  that  the  government  does  not 
believe  that  the  ACS  model  takes  all  of  the  intangible  benefits  properly  into 
consideration. 
3.3  United Kingdom 
In 2008, Postcomm engaged Frontier Economics to produce a report on the cost of 
specific elements of Royal Mail’s USO, assuming specific alternative requirements 
determined  by  Postcomm.  The  report  does  not  consider  many  important 
components of the USO, for example the universal geographic delivery coverage 
obligation. The model used consists of two stages, the first considers the non-price 
demand and market share effects  that lead to the estimate of the net cost. Price 
effects  are  not  considered  in  the  first  stage.  In  the  second  stage  a  new  price  is 
calculated to reflect 100% of the cost saving being passed through to consumers, i.e. 
no  commercial  decision-making  is  assumed.  Frontier  Economics  then  calculates 
volume effects but considers the net cost to be negligible. 
Frontier Economics’ model aims to ensure consistency between volumes, revenues, 
costs and Royal Mail’s commercial incentives by using ‚an engineering cost model 
capturing  operation standards  and  economic  principles  applying in  post‛.7  It  does not, 
however,  consider  in  its  stage  one  calculation  the  interaction  with  other  USO 
dimensions like pricing, universal geographic coverage, the effect of the choice of 
financing mechanism, nor the value of the intangible benefits of the USO. 
The report concludes that, of the six USO elements considered, only the Saturday 
collections and delivery service ‚imposes a significant constraint on Royal Mail‛, the 
cost of which it calculates as £271m  (€400m, 2006/07). The report concludes that 
Royal  Mail  ‚is  not  significantly  disadvantaged‛  by  the  USO.8  The  basis  for  this 
conclusion appears to be the fact that this amount is equivalent to an approximate 
annual efficiency target over four years of 1% of Royal Mail’s cost base and is only a 
third of the current price control’s efficiency targets of 3% per year.9 In our view, the 
report confounds efficiencies and a net cost that is by its very nature an obligation 
outside the influence of management. Frontier Economics does not discuss whether 
                                                           
6   Weseth (2010), slide 7. 
7   Frontier Economics (2008), page 76. 
8   Frontier Economics (2008), pages 14, 15. 
9   Frontier Economics (2008), page 8. 11 
the net cost burden is unfair but its failure to find Royal Mail to be significantly 
disadvantaged suggests that they do not consider the burden to be unfair.  
3.4  Summary 
In summary, none of the studies of the net cost of a postal sector USO discussed 
above  used  a  fully  holistic  approach  to  consider  simultaneously  the  interaction 
between different elements of the USO, intangible benefits and financing.  
4  A Consistent Approach to USO costing and Financing 
As we have already argued, in order to obtain robust results, a holistic approach to 
the costing of the USO is needed. To produce accurate, consistent and transparent 
results, our USO costing approach rests on a sound methodological foundation. It is 
based on a standard industrial organisation model of the postal sector, taking into 
account  the  operators’  market  entry  and  pricing  decisions.  This  ensures  the 
approach is compliant with the Third Directive and possibly with standards set by 
CERP or the national regulatory authority (NRA). 
A  legal  definition  of  the  USO  costing  approach  needs  to  embrace  the  basic 
methodology, the model structure and a description of how to calibrate the model. 
We therefore propose the following steps in defining and setting up a USO costing 
model: 
First, the model structure has to be defined, including binding USO constraints, the 
operators’ pipeline activities and the relevant markets and products that are affected 
by changes in the USO.  
Once the structure is defined, the model is populated with data on prices, volumes, 
elasticities,  etc.  These  data  can  have  various  sources,  for  example  the  USP’s 
accounts, market research, benchmark studies, consumer surveys, etc. Based on this 
information, the USP’s optimum behaviour and the ultimate market outcome in the 
counterfactual scenario can be derived. 













We discuss each step in more detail below. 
4.1  Basic Methodology  
The Directive advocates using the profitability cost approach, comparing the USP’s 
profit  with  and  without  USO.  The  USP’s  profit  is  determined  by  the  market 
outcome in each scenario which itself results from the USP’s, the competitors’ and of 
course their customers’ behaviour (see Figure 3). It also depends on the financing 
mechanism in place (see section 2.3). This implies that it is crucial to first understand 
how  certain  dimensions  of  the  USO  and  its  financing  affect  the  operators’ 
behaviour. 
Figure 3: Basic Methodology 
 
The most important step in the calculation of the net cost is the definition of the 
counterfactual scenario. It describes the competitive market outcome without USO. 
All other regulations (e.g. price controls that are not part of the USO) and legal 
restrictions (e.g. competition law) still apply. 
The counterfactual scenario is, in principle, independent of the USO costing model. 
In practice, however, the approach to calculate the net cost of the USO needs to be 
defined abstractly in a postal law or ordinance. Hence, it has to be open and flexible 
enough to embrace a broad range of potential counterfactuals. The USP’s optimum 
behaviour varies with time and the development of the market. Hence, in practice, 
the definition of the counterfactual can  only be settled after the model has been 
calibrated  and  once  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  USP’s  behaviour  is  clearly 
understood. 
4.2  Model structure 
The following issues related to the model structure require particular attention: 
Aggregation of separate USO dimensions: In principle, all dimensions of the USO 
that  affect  the  USP’s  behaviour  should  be  taken  into  account  in  the  net  cost 
calculation. We have already discussed in 2.1 that individual dimensions of the USO 
Obligation
Scenario with USO Scenario without USO
Obligation Obligation No Obligation
USP Behavior
USP Result (USP) Result USO Net Cost
Market Outcome Market Outcome
Competitor Behavior Competitor Behavior
(USP) Behavior13 
should  not  be  assessed  separately  as  long  as  there  is  interaction  between 
dimensions. It therefore makes sense to calculate the net cost of the USO dimensions 
separately only if and insofar as they are independent.  
Relevant USO entity / markets and products: The USO costing approach defined in 
the Directive relates to the overall profit of the USP rather than the profits solely 
from USO products. Hence, the analysis should consider all business units which 
are affected by the USO or its absence. Usually, it will be all of the USP's operations 
which would change absent the USO – either on the cost or on the benefit side.  
Relevant time-frame: A fundamental issue is defining the glide path to achieving 
the business environment defined in the counterfactual scenario. The USP would 
not be able to behave entirely differently immediately after being freed of the USO. 
Hence, it necessary to define the time-frame within which the counterfactual is to be 
assessed. To derive robust results, it is most appropriate to consider a situation after 
full  transition  and  once  the  USP  and  its  competitors  have  fully  adjusted  their 
behaviour. In determining the USP’s position in this counterfactual scenario, it is 
important  to  consider  its  investments  and  divestitures  in  the  course  of  its 
hypothetical transition from the USO situation to the non-USO situation. 
Relevant costs and benefits: Cost centres are closely linked to specific processes in 
postal operations. Hence, whether a process and its associated costs is relevant for 
determining  the  USO  net  cost  depends  directly  on  the  USO  through  the 
requirements on the process steps (e.g. ubiquitous delivery), and indirectly on the 
USO-affected products passing through these process steps. Our approach considers 
a counterfactual situation after full adjustment to the removal of the USO; however, 
there are strong path-dependencies in the development of markets, leaving legacy 
costs and benefits which need to be taken into account. In the postal sector and in 
other  network  industries,  such  benefits  may  include  an  established  ubiquitous 
legacy network and a good reputation (intangible benefits, e.g. brand value), see 
section 2.2. The existing inefficiently shaped network and high labour costs due to 
civil  servant  contracts  are  examples  of  legacy  costs.  In  our  approach,  the 
counterfactual scenario includes the impact of removing all these costs and benefits. 
This  relies  on  a  deep  understanding  of  the  determinants  of  demand  and  cost 
functions. 
Inefficiencies: The issue of inefficient operations is not specific to the costing of the 
USO.  The  counterfactual  scenario  typically  involves  a  reduction  in  the  USP’s 
operations  compared  to  the  with-USO  situation.  Hence,  with  respect  to  the  cost 
structure, the two scenarios are overlapping and inefficiencies partly cancel each 
other out in the comparison. For those services which would not be offered without 
the USO, inefficiency can be isolated and considered by reviewing the cost base to 14 
assess  whether  an  efficiency  adjustment  is  required  or  by  using  benchmarking 
methods. 
We have argued above that there is a trade-off between transparency, accuracy and 
consistency of the calculation method. This trade-off is especially important with 
regard to the granularity of the model and in view of the available data. To assess 
the impact of a change in the USO, in principle each step in the value chain of each 
product needs to be considered separately. However, due to the large portion of 
joint  and  common  cost  in  postal  production,  it  is  difficult  to  allocate  these  to 
individual products (as required by the Third Directive).10 For the calculation of the 
net cost, it is not necessary to separate accounts as the total profit of the USP is of 
interest; not the profit of USO-products. Hence, actual cost data related to processes 
(e.g. collection, sorting, etc.) can be used on an aggregate basis, as illustrated in  the 
figure belowFehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.. 
Figure 4: Cost aggregation by process 
 
However, to calculate the USO net cost, there is another need for separation, namely 
between  the  services/products  (and  associated  processes)  that  would  be  offered 
equally without a USO and those that would not. Similar to cost aggregation by 
process,  revenue  data  can  be  aggregated  by  product  (see  Figure  5Fehler! 
Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.). 
                                                           
10   Article 14 of the Third Directive states that: ‚The universal service provider(s) shall keep separate 
accounts within their internal accounting systems in order to clearly distinguish between each of 
the services and products which are part of the universal service and those which are not. This 
accounting separation shall be used as an input when Member States calculate the net cost of the 
universal service.‛ See Jaag (2010) for a discussion of information requirements. 15 
Figure 5: Aggregation of benefits by services/products 
 
With  this  granularity  in  the  model,  calculations  will  be  much  simplified  and 
therefore the results are more transparent while still ensuring that the impact of a 
change in the strategy of the USP can be correctly quantified. 
4.3  Model Calibration 
The calibration of the USO costing model involves the population of the model – 
primarily with actual data, but also with the defined counterfactual scenario (i.e. the 
hypothetical behaviour of the USP, competitors, and consumers without USO). Of 
course, it is primarily the USP that knows its actual cost and revenue structure and 
that  needs  to  determine  its  business  strategy  in  the  counterfactual  scenario. 
However, its assumptions and all parts of the calculations must be well supported 
and examinable by the NRA or the ministry to give confidence in the evaluation. For 
instance, consideration on the level of unregulated prices that would be applied 
would need to be considered to ensure that they are in accordance with competition 
law. 
4.4  Stylised Example 
The above model description can be illustrated by a stylised example summarising 
the model and its results (see Table 2). The example is very much simplified and 
assumes zero variable costs. 
Actual Situation with USO 
In  the  example,  the  USO  has  three  dimensions:  First,  it  prescribes  certain 
accessibility standards, e.g. that x% of the population must be able to reach the next 
self-run post office within at most y minutes and the next franchised counter within 
at most z minutes. This results in the USP’s observed behaviour with respect to 
number, location and type of post office and counters. Second, USO products must 
be  delivered  daily  to  all  households  in  the  country.  Third,  prices  of  the  USO 
products (single-piece mail) must be uniform.  
Counterfactual Situation without USO 
Without  a  USO,  we  assume  it  would  be  optimal  for  the  USP  to  rely  fully  on 
franchised  counters,  to  restrict  doorstep  delivery  to  80%  of  households  and  to 
regionally differentiate prices. The effects of the differences in the two scenarios are 
Priority Single Piece Mail
Economy Single Piece Mail
Economy Bulk Mail
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displayed in Table 2.11 Of course, there is a significant and straightforward effect on 
fixed costs. The effect on turnover  (benefits) is less simple. In the USO-scenario, 
uniform pricing offers cherry-picking opportunities to competing operators. Hence, 
USP overall market shares for USO products are lower in the scenario with USO. 
However, quality is higher (at least for  mail recipients  who would not have 
doorstep delivery without USO), such that in equilibrium a higher average price can 
be maintained. In our example, bulk mail is not part of the USO and therefore not 
directly affected. However,  the USP profits from its reputation and from the fact 
that all households are connected to the delivery network. Hence, without USO, the 
USP’s  market  share,  on  average,  is  lower  than  with  USO.  Of  course,  in  the 
calculation of the USO net cost, this effect has to be taken into account. It is assumed 
that there is a compensation mechanism in place, such that competitors have to 
contribute to the financing of the USO. This distorts their market coverage decision 
and  thus  positively  affects  the  USP’s  market  shares  in  the  scenario  with  USO. 
Hence, the effect of the financing mechanism on the USP’s volume weakens the 
negative effect of price uniformity on the market share of its USO products and 
reinforces  the  positive  effect  of  ubiquity  on  the  market  share  of  its  non-USO 
products. 
Table 2: Stylised example 




















P.O. box delivery for 20% of households 
with highest delivery cost 
 
  200 
Postal Network 
2000 self-run Post Offices 






0 self-run Post Offices 
3000 franchised counters 
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Uniform prices for single piece mail 
80% market share single piece mail; 
average price 0.5€ 
Non-USO Products 











Differentiated prices for single piece mail 
90% market share single piece mail; 
average price 0.40€ 
 





  360 
 
 
  150 
Profit    40      130 
In our stylised example, the overall net cost amounts to 90 currency units. 
                                                           
11   On the optimum behavior in the counterfactual scenario, see cf. Roy (2010). 17 
5  Conclusion 
Assessing the net cost and unfair burden of the USO, and determining how this 
should be financed, is a key issue for operators, regulators and other stakeholders in 
the European postal industry. The Third Directive provides some guidance as to 
how  the  net  cost  should  be  calculated.  In  our  paper,  we  discuss  how  these 
specifications  can  be  interpreted  and  applied  in  practice  in  order  to  result  in 
consistent and robust assessment of the USO net cost. 
In  this  paper  we  argue  that  a  holistic  approach  is  appropriate  to  meet  these 
requirements.  Therefore,  calculating  the  net  cost  of  the  USO  goes  significantly 
beyond  determining  ‚unprofitable  routes‛.  It  is  about  assessing  different 
competitive outcomes taking into account all relevant determinants of the USP’s 
demand and cost. As a prerequisite, it is important to understand how the USO 
affects the USP’s operations, its customers and its competitors. An important task in 
undertaking this analysis, therefore, is to properly define the environment in which 
the USP would exist without the USO. 
When  it  comes  to  compensating  a  USP,  net  cost  calculations  must  be  accurate, 
robust and transparent. Therefore a detailed robust ‘but-for’ world in which the USP 
is assumed to be a profit-maximising entity needs to be developed. 
   18 
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